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In Investing Japan: Foreign Capital, Monetary Standards, 
and Economic Development, 1859- 2011, Simon Bytheway makes a 
major contribution to our understanding of the economic history of 
modern Japan.  Demonstrating an exhaustive command of his 
sources, particularly those in Japanese, Bytheway subverts an 
entrenched historical narrative wherein the Japanese, beginning in the 
early Meiji period, essentially pulled themselves up by their 
bootstraps economically and achieved a thriving, modern economy 
with minimal help if any from outside.  Bytheway successfully 
challenges this fallacious version of ‘autonomous economic 
development’ by detailing the great extent to which little noticed 
foreign investment furthered national goals and propelled the 
Japanese economy, particularly at important historical junctures such 
as during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 or following the 
Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923.  “Foreign borrowing,” the author 
concludes, “was nothing less than the crux of Japan’s prewar capital 
formation: it simultaneously financed domestic industrial 
development, the conduct of war, and territorial expansion on the 
Asian continent” (p. 2).  
Bytheway organizes his discussion into three distinct but interrelated sections.  The first details Japan’s 
lengthy transition from a de facto bimetallic standard to the adoption of the gold standard in October 1897, and the 
consequential effects on Japan’s economy of that decision.  The second section explores the extent of foreign 
investment in Japan from the years 1897 up through the 1930s, while the third and final part looks at foreign investment 
after World War Two.  A postscript seamlessly incorporates the momentous events of March 11, 2011, when the twin 
disasters of earthquake and tsunami rocked Japan. 
For Bytheway, arguably the key event in the history of foreign investment in modern Japan was the adoption 
of the gold standard, following which “Japan enjoyed an unprecedented period of openness toward foreign capital 
distinguished by rapid economic development” (p. 47).  Coupled with Japan’s stunning victory in the Sino-Japanese 
War of 1894-1895, Bytheway asserts, “there was a new incentive, an international prestige to investing in Japan that 
attracted unprecedented amounts of foreign and domestic capital to productive investments” (p. 58).  The Japanese 
state’s judicious use of that imported capital in its widely-publicized modernization program, in turn, inspired ever 
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greater confidence in Japan’s credit-worthiness and helped forge a close financial-military alliance with Great Britain, 
the world’s most powerful military and financial power at the time.  The author laments that this important story was 
later superseded in the historiography by the more dramatic tale of Japan’s economic difficulties from the mid-1920s 
through the early 1930s.  Nevertheless, in Part II of his book, Bytheway builds a solid case in defense of the importance 
of foreign investment and joint ventures prior to the outbreak of WWII. 
The Russo-Japanese War exemplifies the essential role played by foreign investment in Japan.  As is well 
known, the early Meiji regime, worried that outside investment might equate to greater imperial control over Japan, 
initially rejected foreign capital in favor of domestic funds supplied by wealthy merchant houses.  However, when the 
burdensome costs associated with prosecuting the Russo-Japanese War made such a policy of autonomous 
development “untenable” (90), the Japanese government quickly turned to the financial markets of London and New 
York (and later Berlin) for necessary funds.  Japan used the monies raised in three important ways, all of which proved 
typical of the primary uses of foreign investment throughout the pre-war period:  first, to help defray war costs (and, 
relatedly, to further Japan’s own imperialistic ambitions); second, to help “finance the redemption of its own short-
term, high-interest domestic bond issuances with long-term, low-interest foreign loans” (p. 101); third, to invest in 
essential modernization of domestic infrastructure.  The author highlights the expansion of the Yawata Steel Works 
during wartime as but one example. 
The Japanese state also insured that any additional inputs of foreign investment in the prewar period, whether 
in the form of municipal loans or direct foreign investments in joint ventures, were similarly harnessed to the larger 
goal of promoting the nation’s overall economic development.  Kobe, the first city to raise money on the London 
financial market in 1899, for example, used the funds for “potable water and sewerage works” (p.113).  Yokohama 
followed suit shortly thereafter, raising capital to pay for “harbor repairs and reconstruction” (p.113).  In total, six of 
Japan’s largest cities floated loans on foreign markets between 1899 and 1927, all of which were earmarked for 
significant infrastructural projects.  Parastatal entities like the South Manchurian Railway and the Oriental 
Development Company similarly funded their projects in part with foreign loans (thereby aiding the cause of Japanese 
empire).  Bytheway, moreover, details a long list of direct foreign investments to private companies in this period, 
which encompasses seemingly every vital sector of industry from armaments to public transport to automobiles.  After 
a brief hiatus following the outbreak of WWII, foreign investment soon resumed its vital role in fostering economic 
modernization and growth after 1945.   
Even when the Japanese government was aggressively promoting protectionist policies during the first couple 
of decades after war’s end, economic realities demanded that it let in a select few foreign companies, such as Citibank 
and International Business Machines (IBM), which possessed expertise and technological strengths unmatched in 
Japan.  Yet as it strove to keep out foreign competition, Japan turned to the World Bank for “infrastructural 
‘development loans’ [that] extended generous guidance and funding to agricultural projects, waterworks, road 
construction, and … the construction of the iconic bullet train (shinkansen) railway” (p. 200).  To critics who might 
counter that such loans represented a minuscule fraction of total domestic investment in the period, Bytheway responds 
with an argument similar to the one he deploys regarding the prewar period: that the true significance of the thirty-
one such projects funded by World Bank loans is “essentially qualitative rather than quantitative” (p. 204).  
Furthermore, when the Japanese government finally began giving in to U.S. pressures to liberalize its domestic markets 
in the early 1970s, the aforementioned equation arguably reversed itself, with the quantitative overtaking the 
qualitative: witness the plethora of foreign franchises that have sprouted up throughout the country, especially in the 
fast food industry. 
In his postscript, Bytheway predicts that foreign investment will continue to play an essential role in the 
Japanese economy.  The events of early March 2011 left Japan devastated.  Even a deep-pocketed nation like Japan 
would need help recovering.  As Bytheway notes, “Relief requires money, but reconstruction requires investment” 
(241).  Where can Japan turn other than to its long-established foreign creditors?  Bytheway also detects a possible 
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opportunity here for the Japanese more generally to engage in a reconsideration of their ambivalent attitude towards 
foreign investment and instead embrace the latter as an essential component of long-term financial successes in the 
twenty-first century.  
Clearly, Bytheway’s thesis is novel and his overall argument is strong.  The work is not without its (relatively 
minor) flaws, however.  Bytheway’s prose is needlessly verbose (which judicious editing might have amended), 
frustrating this reviewer.  His interjection of lengthy yet underutilized tables interferes unnecessarily with the narrative 
flow; rather than imposing them on the main text, perhaps they should have been consigned to appendices.  Finally, 
in marshalling all his evidence the author occasionally seems more interested in detailing the trees than illuminating 
the forest.  That said, Bytheway’s conclusion provides a masterful summation of the entire monograph; in fact, if 
pressed for time one might profitably read just that last section.   
In sum, Bytheway has written an important monograph that not only challenges successfully a dominant 
historical paradigm concerning the economic history of modern Japan, but points the way forward for others to follow 
up on his groundbreaking efforts.  
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